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Abstract
In a recent paper, Aidan Lyon and Mark Colyvan have proposed
an explanation of the structure of the bee’s honeycomb based on the
mathematical Honeycomb Conjecture. This explanation has instantly
become one of the standard examples in the philosophical debate on
mathematical explanations of physical phenomena. In this critical
note, I argue that the explanation is not scientifically adequate. The
reason for this is that the explanation fails to do justice to the essen-
tially three-dimensional structure of the bee’s honeycomb.
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1 Introduction
The philosophical debate on mathematical explanations of physical phenom-
ena relies on good, real-life examples of such explanations, and philosophers
have considerably widened the stock of examples that serve as starting point
for philosophical reflection. I think this is a positive trend.
However, our examples should better be scientifically adequate. I will
argue in the present paper that one of the standard examples of the debate,
the explanation of the structure of the bee’s honeycomb based on the math-
ematical Honeycomb Conjecture, is not scientifically adequate. I will cast
doubt on the idea that the Honeycomb Conjecture is part of an explana-
tion of the structure of the bee’s honeycomb – the purported explanation is
flawed on mathematical grounds. I establish the importance of this result
by showing that my arguments undermine a recent philosophical argument
by Alan Baker (2012).
2 Lyon’s and Colyvan’s Explanation
The explanation of the geometric structure of the bee’s honeycomb based on
the Honeycomb Conjecture (HC) was first proposed by Aidan Lyon and Mark
Colyvan in their 2008 paper “The Explanatory Power of Phase Space”.1 The
explanandum is that the bee’s honeycomb has a hexagonal shape as opposed
to some other geometric shape. The explanans has two parts, one biological,
the other mathematical. The biological part is that it is evolutionary advan-
tageous to minimize the amount of wax used in the construction of honey-
combs; Lyon and Colyvan trace this part of the explanation back to Darwin.
The mathematical part of the explanation is provided by the Honeycomb
Conjecture and its recent proof by Thomas Hales (2001). The Honeycomb
Conjecture states that “a hexagonal grid represents the best way to divide a
surface into regions of equal area with the least total perimeter ”(Lyon and
Colyvan, 2008, pp. 228). Figure 1 shows a part of the hexagonal grid. Lyon
and Colyvan claim that the combination of these facts together explains the
structure of the bee’s honeycomb.
This explanation of a physical phenomenon based on a mathematical
theorem has subsequently been adopted as as a standard example in the
philosophical discussion of mathematical explanations, see e.g. Baker (2009),
1This is not to say that Lyon and Colyvan are the first to suggest a connection between
the bee’s honeycomb and some mathematical conjecture. As early as 36 B.C., Marcus
Terentius Varro claimed that the hexagon “encloses the greatest amount of space”, which
explains the structure of the bee’s honeycomb, see Hales (2000, p. 448). However, Lyon
and Colyvan introduced the explanation into the philosophical discussion.
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Figure 1: Hexagonal Tiling
Baker and Colyvan (2011), Saatsi (2011), Lyon (2012), Baker (2012), Tallant
(2013) and there has been considerable disagreement about its philosophical
analysis and significance.
So far, it has never been disputed that the explanation given by Lyon
and Colyvan is acceptable on mathematical or scientific grounds. This is
what I will to do in section 4. Now I will illustrate the importance of the
case for the philosophical discussion.
3 Baker: A Philosophical Motivation
One might think that the honeycomb case is but one of many examples
proposed and discussed by philosophers, and that therefore, while it is re-
grettable if it turns out not to be an actual explanation, this will not really
affect philosophical arguments. However, this is not so. A recent paper by
Alan Baker (2012) relies to a good part on the scientific adequacy of the
honeycomb case.
In his paper, Baker attacks the so-called Transmission View of mathemat-
ical explanations in science (MES), which he attributes to Mark Steiner. Ac-
cording to this view, MES work via a transmission of an intra-mathematical
explanation to some physical explanandum. The MES with explanans M ,
typically a proof, used in the explanation of a physical explanandum P ∗, writ-
ten M → P ∗ is, first and foremost, an explanation of an intra-mathematical
explanandum M∗, written M → M∗, and the explanation of M∗ is trans-
mitted to P ∗ via a bridge principle, written M∗ ↔ P ∗. If we remove the
bridge principle from the complete MES, M → M∗ ↔ P ∗, we are left with
an intra-mathematical explanation, M →M∗.
According to Baker, there are two separate problems with this view. The
first is a counterexample, the honeycomb case. The second is an argument
for the thesis that the proof of a mathematical theorem is not necessarily part
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of a scientific explanation, even if the theorem is used in that explanation.2
Baker notes that two conditions have to hold in order for the honeycomb
case to be a counterexample. First, it has to be a genuine MES, and second,
the proof must not explain the theorem. Baker thinks that the honeycomb
case is clearly a genuine MES. He writes that “there is not much to be said [on
this condition], other than that biologists do generally take this to be the best
explanation of why honeybees build their cells in the shape of hexagons, and
that it clearly makes nontrivial use of mathematics” (Baker, 2012, p. 250).
Baker repeats the claim that biologists take this explanation seriously later
in his paper, but he does not substantiate it with references.
I will argue below that the first condition does not hold. If this is so,
then Baker’s main counterexample is flawed. Thus, the honeycomb case is
worth our attention. It is crucial to get a scientifically adequate picture.
4 Why the Explanation Fails
In this section, I argue that the explanation proposed by Lyon and Colyvan
is an inadequate explanation of the structure of the bee’s honeycomb for
mathematical reasons.
I first show that the explanation is deficient because the HC solves a
two-dimensional problem, but the actual honeycomb has a three-dimensional
structure that cannot be adequately captured in two dimensions. This es-
tablishes that the HC provides only a fraction of the mathematics relevant
to the bee’s honeycomb at best.
I then cast doubt on the idea that we should accept the HC even as a
partial explanation of the hexagonal shape that is part of the actual, three-
dimensional honeycomb. The problem is that once we consider the honey-
comb in three dimensions, the adequacy of a separate explanation of the
two-dimensional substructure becomes dubious.
4.1 The Explanation is Incomplete
Lyon and Colyvan claim that Hales’s theorem can help to explain what they
call the hexagonal structure of the honeycomb. This presupposes that the
structure of the honeycomb is in fact hexagonal – but this is incorrect. It is
only the form of the openings of honeycombs, or their prismatic base, that
show a hexagonal pattern, not the entire honeycomb. Actual honeycombs
show hexagonal openings on the surface, but their actual geometric structure
is more complicated than this: Honeycombs consist of two layers of congruent
2Baker does not want to rest his entire argument on just one counterexample, and
notes the application of the four-color theorem as a second counterexample. I will not
assess the strength of this example. However, the honeycomb case is his main case study
and appears to carry most of the argumentative weight. I will not discuss Baker’s second
problem.
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cells, each one with a hexagonal opening and a non-flat bottom; see figure 2
for an approximate geometrical representation of a cell.
Figure 2: The three-dimensional Honeycomb
Mathematically speaking, the problem with Lyon’s and Colyvan’s pro-
posal is that their explanation applies to a two-dimensional structure, whereas
the actual honeycomb is three-dimensional. The HC says: “any partition of
the plane into regions of equal area has perimeter at least that of the reg-
ular hexagonal honeycomb tiling”(Hales, 2001, abstract). The bee’s honey-
comb, however, is a three-dimensional structure that does not reduce to the
two-dimensional case. What we should be looking for is an optimal three-
dimensional structure that can be applied to the actual honeycomb instead
of the two-dimensional HC. Put simply, the structure should minimize area
relative to the volume of cells instead of perimeter relative to area.
To treat the honeycomb as a two-dimensional optimization problem is
not a priori unreasonable, but on closer inspection, it proves to be problem-
atic. For example, if the honeycomb consisted of one thin layer of hexagonal
cells only, then a two-dimensional description would probably capture the
relevant aspects of the structure.3 However, it is simply a fact that the hon-
eycomb has a non-trivial three-dimensional structure. The critical point is
that the actual structure comes in two layers such that the cells are open on
one end only. That is why we cannot possibly account for the shape of the
rhombic caps in two dimensions: the caps do not fit into the two-dimensional
representation and would have to be omitted – the third dimension is neces-
sary to represent this aspect of the structure. The three rhombi can be seen
very nicely in the geometrical representation, see figure 2.
The problem I just raised has gone unnoticed in the philosophical dis-
cussion of the honeycomb case, but it is well-known in the mathematical
3This has been suggested by Erica Klarreich, see the quote below. The qualification
“probably” is necessary because the claim that this structure is optimal, despite its plau-
sibility, would have to be proven.
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literature. For example, Erica Klarreich discusses Hales’s proof of the HC
and writes:
Hales’s work confirms that the hexagonal arrangement is the
one that uses the smallest amount of beeswax to create a single
thin layer of cells, open on each end. In an actual honeycomb,
the cells in each layer are capped by three rhombic faces, forming
a rhombic dodecahedron. (Klarreich, 2000, p. 157)
Klarreich at least implicitly acknowledges that the HC does not directly
apply to an actual honeycomb. The three-dimensional structure to which
the two-dimensional HC applies is a prismatic extension of the hexagonal
grid, while what Klarreich calls the actual honeycomb is depicted in figure
2.
Some formulations in the mathematical literature are even more succinct.
Frank Morgan discusses the HC in his introduction to geometric measure
theory. Immediately after stating and proving the HC, he adds the following
observations under the title “The Bees’ Honeycomb”:
The bees actually have a more complicated, three-dimensional
problem involving how the ends of the hexagonal cells are shaped
to interlock with the ends of the cells on the other side. L. Fejes
Tóth [...] showed that the bees’ three-dimensional structure can
be improved slightly, at least for the mathematical model with
infinitely thin walls. (Morgan, 1988, pp. 166)
Morgan states that the hexagonal grid of the HC is not the relevant
structure for the actual honeycomb, and he even mentions an alternative
approach.
It could be thought that it was Thomas Hales who suggested this appli-
cation of the HC – but this is not so. In his paper proving the HC, Hales
discusses the historical link between the conjecture and the bee’s honey-
comb, but he does not propose an application of the theorem along the lines
of Lyon’s and Colyvan’s idea.
There is a gap between the philosophical and the mathematical discus-
sion. Mathematicians think of the bee’s honeycomb as three-dimensional and
do not attempt to explain it via HC. Philosophers, on the other hand, have
unfortunately neglected the three-dimensionality of the structure to date.
Even if we disregard the shape of the real honeycomb, there is a sys-
tematic problem with the explanation based on the HC: It applies to two-
dimensional surfaces and therefore can only take the shape of the openings
of the cells into account. This, however, is not sufficient. It is not clear that
a structure with optimally shaped openings minimizes the amount of wax. A
structure can have cells with optimal openings, but some non-optimal shape
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otherwise. We cannot infer the optimality of cells from the shape of the
openings. To make sure that a structure is optimal, we have to take the
whole three-dimensional structure into account.
4.2 The Honeycomb Conjecture Is (Probably) Irrelevant
We saw in the last subsection that Lyon’s and Colyvan’s explanation is in-
complete: It cannot capture all that is mathematically relevant about the
actual honeycomb. This still leaves open the possibility that the HC is of
some relevance to the actual honeycomb. After all, the openings of the cells
are hexagonal, see the bottom of figure 2 – so it is possible that we can apply
the HC to explain the optimal shape of the openings. This would consti-
tute a partial explanation in that the HC explains a part of the structure.
In this subsection, I will argue that the HC is probably not even a partial
explanation of the shape of the actual honeycomb.
The argument is not directed against the use of mathematical optimiza-
tion in explanations of physical structures; some form of mathematical op-
timization may be relevant to the bee’s honeycomb. Before I proceed, it
may be helpful to clarify the role of mathematics in this kind of explana-
tion. What is necessary for a successful explanation involving mathematical
optimization?
I argued above that the relevant optimization problem is three-dimensional
in the present case. What is minimized is the amount of wax relative to cells
of unit volume. Then, the optimization problem has to satisfy certain bound-
ary conditions; one of them is that each cell needs an opening of reasonable
size. A possible mathematical formulation of the problem is as a bounded
form of the Kelvin problem, the optimal tiling of space with cells of equal
volume, with the restriction that the cells lie between two parallel planes such
that each cell has an opening in one of the planes.4 Additionally, the opti-
mization will probably have to take the thickness of the walls into account.
Of course, purely mathematical considerations will not do. For example,
we have to find out if and how an “optimization process” is implemented in
the world: Do the bees construct the beehive from beginning to end, or is
some other process involved? These issues are still debated in the biological
literature. Finally, there are some constraints on possible structures due to
stability.5
The question whether any form of mathematical optimization is relevant
to the bee’s honeycomb is an open scientific question. For the sake of the
argument, I assume that some three-dimensional optimization problem is in
fact relevant, and answer the question whether, under this assumption, the
4Fejes Tóth (1964) proposed and analyzed this kind of problem.
5See Klarreich (2000) and Hales (2000) for more on the mathematical side and Pirk
et al. (2004), Hepburn et al. (2007) and Bauer and Bienefeld (2013) for more on the
biological side of the story.
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two-dimensional HC is relevant to the explanation as well.
We can distinguish two cases. The first possibility is that the solution
to the right mathematical optimization problem does not have cells with
hexagonal openings at all. In this case, the bee’s honeycomb would sim-
ply not be an optimal solution, and the HC would be inapplicable, as the
hexagonal tiling is not part of the structure. This is a real possibility: Three-
dimensional geometric optimization problems are notoriously hard, and opti-
mal solutions to three-dimensional problems relevant to the bee’s honeycomb
are not known. To give an example, we do not know the optimal solutions
to the aforementioned mathematical honeycomb structures proposed in Fe-
jes Tóth (1964).
The second possibility is that the hexagonal grid is part of the three-
dimensional structure that constitutes the solution to a three-dimensional
optimization problem. Even if this is the case, it is still probable that the
hexagonal grid is part of the real, three-dimensional honeycomb because
this whole structure is optimal in three-dimensions, and not because the
grid is the optimal solution to a two-dimensional problem. This is, once
more, a qualified statement, as the relevant mathematical results for three-
dimensional optimization problems are not known. The hexagonal grid is
nothing but a geometrical structure, and the fact that it is part of a more
complex structure can be unrelated to the fact that the hexagonal grid fea-
tures in the HC.
What would have to be established to show the relevance of the HC to
a three-dimensional structure? The HC is one possible explanation for the
shape of openings of the three-dimensional honeycomb structure. However,
the structure is three-dimensional, and it is probably the solution to a differ-
ent, three-dimensional optimization problem which also explains the shape
of the entire structure. So one way to establish the relevance of the HC
would be to show that the reason why the three-dimensional structure has
its shape subsumes the reason why a part of the structure has its shape. Or,
put differently: The proof of the optimality of the three-dimensional struc-
ture would somehow have to imply the proof in the two-dimensional case, i.e.
the proof of the HC. It is unclear whether such a relation between results
is plausible or can be established, as we simply do not know the relevant
optimality results. However, as long as we do not know whether the HC is
relevant here, we should suspend our judgement about this case.
It could be objected that the hexagonal shape of the openings does not
have to be a consequence of the optimality of the three-dimensional structure,
because it is a biological requirement that the cells of the honeycomb have
(two-dimensional) openings in the shape of the hexagonal grid. It would then
be reasonable to postulate this structure as a kind of boundary condition for
the optimality of the entire, three-dimensional cells.
However, if we simply postulate the hexagonal structure as a boundary
condition, then the HC loses its explanatory power. In this case, we do not
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use the HC to explain the structure of the bee’s honeycomb, but we use it
in the deduction of a different result, the optimality of a three-dimensional
structure. If, on the other hand, we could prove that a) the hexagonal
openings are part of the optimal three-dimensional cell structure, and that b)
the proof of the optimality of the three-dimensional structure really subsumes
the two-dimensional, hexagonal case, the relevance of the HC would not have
to be postulated, but it would follow from a stronger result. In this case, the
HC would indeed be explanatory.
In this section, I have not ruled out the possibility that the HC is ex-
planatorily relevant to the actual honeycomb. However, the argument shows
that the relevance of the HC depends on optimality results in three dimen-
sions, and as we do not yet have a clue what the optimal solution in three
dimensions might be, we should abstain from such speculations at this point
of mathematical progress.
5 Conclusion and Outlook
My goal in this paper was to argue against the original explanation of the
bee’s honeycomb proposed by Lyon and Colyvan. I offered two arguments for
this thesis. First, I established that the original explanation is incomplete
because the real honeycomb is non-trivially three-dimensional. Second, I
argued that because the real structure is three-dimensional, the HC could
be superfluous, because what matters then is a three-dimensional problem.
The main philosophical lesson we can learn from this case is that we
have to be more careful in the use of examples from science, especially if we
rely on our examples to be real-life cases. The discussion also has imme-
diate consequences for the debate on mathematical explanations in science.
As the original explanation based on the HC is not scientifically adequate,
we should stop using it as a case of mathematical explanations in science
and postpone the discussion of the role of mathematics for the structure of
the bee’s honeycomb until we have a clear, well-founded explanation of this
phenomenon. As a case in point, my argument undermines the use of the
honeycomb case as a counterexample by Alan Baker.
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